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Abstract— Recent developments in the testing and safety 
assurances of Automated Driving Systems (ADSs) have shifted 
from traditional distance-based approach (i.e. vehicle miles 
travelled) to scenario-based approach. Various studies have been 
conducted on different aspects of the scenario-based testing 
workflow such as scenario generation, scenario description 
language, and scenario analysis. This study intends to build on 
top of the individual functional modules introduced for scenario-
based testing and contributes towards a common test framework, 
based on the experience gained from the Innovate UK’s 
OmniCAV project. The Test Framework introduced in this 
paper consists of: Description of Test Scenarios, Different Types 
of Testing and Allocation of Tests, Generation of Test cases, Data 
Collection, & Analysis, Correlation of obtained Results and 
Evidence Gathering for functional and behavioral verification. 
The framework and processes defined here have relevance to 
real-world practice and contribute towards both verifiability and 
certifiability of ADSs. 
Keywords—Verification & Validation, Autonomous Vehicles, 
scenario-based testing, testing framework, scenario and test-case 
generation, scenario description language 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Verification and Validation (V&V) are vital parts of the 
development and deployment of any engineering system. The 
V&V processes are well established in more mature sectors of 
engineering such as aerospace and traditional automotive 
systems. However, they are not as well developed in areas such 
as autonomy. The V&V ultimately should enable the safe 
operation of automated vehicles and safety of people. Systems 
are verified with respect to the specified requirements. 
Verification methods can be defined to be: ‘methods by which 
confidence can be gained in the correctness of a system with 
respect to its specification [1]. These methods can be divided 
into formal verification, dynamic and virtual testing. Formal 
verification attempts to prove at least some degree of 
correctness of the system model with respect to requirements; 
dynamic testing employs test instances to gain confidence in 
the correctness of the actual system. Development of virtual 
environment representing the real world (e.g., synthetic 
environment and models) is of great importance for conducting 
verification, especially for automated vehicles, as limited 
physical testing can be performed due to the state space 
growth. The future state (xk+1) of Automated Driving Systems 
(ADSs) will depend not only on the current state (xk) and 
environment (uk), but also on the past states and environment 
of the system from which it may have learnt or adapted, this is 
expressed as below.  faut is the function of autonomy. 
 
 
Due to the large state space, verifying every possible state 
is likely to be very difficult in practical terms.  
In general, this system-level behavior must satisfy the 
defined functional and operational safety requirements. 
Appropriate evidence needs to be collected to make sure an 
ADS behavior has been verified with respect to the 
requirements. Gathering evidence must show that all the 
applicable requirements of the rules and regulations have been 
conformed to. This requires the development of valid test 
scenarios and scalable techniques for verifying that the 
requirements for autonomous functions are consistently met 
and are traceable. Virtual testing also allows scenario play 
back, proving that there is sufficient confidence that the 
defined requirements are satisfied by the implementation of 
each element and system’s behavior (i.e., ADS software), and 
will sufficiently be safe throughout its life-time. Gathering the 
result allows evaluation of the adequacy of current safety 
assurance arguments (pass/fail criteria) and is vital for ADS 
certification. It should be noted that developed capabilities 
potentially have cross-domain usage. For example, the 
capabilities developed for ADSs domain can be assessed for 
adequacy and used in other domains such as Maritime, Rail, 
Civil Aviation, and Military Aviation. 
Traditionally, distance-based metric, i.e. vehicle miles 
travelled, has been used to demonstrate technology maturity 
and provide safety assurance for driving systems. However, for 
ADSs, Kalra et. al suggested that they would need to be driven 
for 11 billion miles to demonstrate they are 20% better than 
human drivers [2]. Therefore, for higher levels of automation a 
distance-based verification approach where driving many test 
miles on test grounds and public roads is not an economically 
viable solution. This led to the shift from distance-based 
approach to a scenario-based approach for ADS safety 
assurance. Various studies have been published on different 
aspects of the scenario-based testing workflow such as scenario 
generation [3][4][5], scenario description format [6][7][8], and 
scenario analysis [9][10][11]. The auto-generated test cases 
from ADS scenarios can also be replicated in other domains 
where specific definition languages and ranged values are used. 
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Consideration is required to see which applications can be used 
directly with little or no change to the system architecture 
developed for the ADS use-case, and which applications will 
require further development or changes to the architecture. 
Other domain use cases including Maritime Autonomous 
Systems (MAS) are being developed for use across a range of 
sectors. Relevant methodologies enabling their certification 
and assurance are also urgently needed. In general, some of the 
challenges towards V&V of the ADS and other Autonomous 
Systems (AS) are as follows: 
• Development of computationally scalable techniques to 
formalize and verify the requirements for autonomous 
functions (for consistency, traceability, and conducting 
V&V). 
• Demonstrate (by gathering evidence) that all the applicable 
requirements of the rules and regulations have been 
conformed to.  
• Collect the evidence and demonstrate that system-level 
behavior satisfies the defined functional/ operational cyber 
security and safety requirements.  
• Demonstrate (prove) that there is sufficient confidence that 
the defined requirements are satisfied by the 
implementation of each element and system’s behavior and 
will be sufficiently safe throughout its life. 
• Evaluate the adequacy of current safety assurance 
arguments (pass/fail criteria) for certification of AS; How 
much of a safety case needs updating for a small system 
change or adding features? 
• Address the need for mapping certification requirements to 
test regimes. 
• Devise new or improve the existing test methods, 
techniques and tools for scalability of testing. Build the 
means/tools for test decomposition and systematic 
generation of test scenarios (scenario variation), 
parameterization of tests, and reproducible concrete test 
cases. 
• Allocation of the tests and use of dynamic testing, virtual 
testing (scenario play back), or formal verification (in itself 
or in combination) as the effective means of verifying AS. 
• Ascertain in how to secure the synthetic environment itself 
in order to collect valid results? 
• Establish in how the V&V results obtained e.g. from 
certified simulation can aid to what degree and effect to 
provide sufficient evidence for assurance and certification 
purposes? 
• Realize that cyber security feature adds complexity to V&V 
tests. AS test ecosystems should include public, virtual, 
controlled and cyber-physical testing environments (for 
cyber-physical tests) 
• Determine some metrics to see “verification is actually 
done”. 
The work discussed in this paper addresses some of the 
above challenges. It elaborates on a Test Framework that 
includes test scenarios, test allocation, test result collection, 
analysis, and correlation of simulation and physical testing 
results, and evidence gathering. The structure of this paper is 
given in a spiral fashion. It starts at high level with all the 
elements in a scenario-based V&V process, and subsequently 
the workflows for both ADS V&V and simulation against real 
world comparison are illustrated. The paper then focusses on 
the simulation-based V&V process and demonstrates a detailed 
modularized framework. In the final part, the paper discusses 
how such framework is developed and implemented within the 
OmniCAV project. While the framework discussed in this 
paper is demonstrated from an ADS’ perspective, the 
framework is relevant for other domains also. 
II. ELEMENTS OF THE EVALUATION CONTINUUM 
It is important to first differentiate and better understand the 
terms used in this paper, i.e., use case, test scenario and test 
case. A use case describes the system behavior as a sequence 
of actions linking the result to a particular actor. A test scenario 
is a specific path through a use case, i.e., a specific sequence of 
actions. A test case is a set of test case preconditions, inputs, 
and expected results, developed to drive the execution of a test 
item to meet test objectives, including correct implementation, 
error identification, checking quality, and other valued 
information [12]. A use case can correlate to multiple test 
scenarios, and a test scenario can result into multiple test cases. 
Similar concept is also proposed in a later study in which three 
levels of scenarios were proposed: functional scenario, abstract 
scenarios, logical scenario, and concrete scenario. Functional 
scenario sits at the most abstract level and can result into 
multiple logical scenarios, and one logical scenario can result 
into multiple concrete scenarios. Logical scenario describes 
parameter using ranges, and concrete scenario uses concrete 
values [13][14].  
Figure 1 illustrates the key elements of a scenario-based 
evaluation continuum. The workflow is independent from the 
test execution environment, and is be applicable for simulation 
run, real-world execution as well as X-in-the-loop (XiL) 
testing. The core aspect of this workflow is the scenario; 
information required within a scenario is created, processed 
and assessed throughout the whole process. This forms the 
overall scenario-based V&V framework. At the high level, 
every scenario-based V&V framework will consist of three 
main elements: scenario, the (test) environment and 
certification/safety evidence & argument that are described 
below.   
Scenario element sits at the upstream of the workflow, and 
from it the structured scenario artefacts together with pass/fail 
criteria are created. Scenario element includes three sub-
processes: “create”, “format” and “store”. Create sub-process 
represents the creation of scenario content; scenarios can be 
created using two different approaches – knowledge-driven and 
data-driven. The OmniCAV project has explored various 
scenario generation methods belong to both approaches, this 
will be described in the following section in more details. 
Furthermore, the scenario creation can be tailored towards 
different focuses areas, for example system engineering, safety, 
cyber security or in-service testing. After scenario generation, 
the scenario content needs to be represented in a human and 
machine-readable format. A two-abstraction approach for 
scenario description [6] was used in the OmniCAV project 
which meet both regulatory and development needs of ADS 
testing. The structured scenarios will then be stored in a 
scenario database for storage, sharing, analysis and query 
purposes.  
Environment element contains different choices of 
execution environment, such as real-world, simulation or a 
hybrid (XiL). Test allocation is a key step within the 
Environment element. This steps entails the allocation of test 
scenarios to be executed in different environments. Once the 
allocation or the test plan has been created, the next step is to 
execute and run the scenario.  
Certification/safety evidence & argument element 
contains Analyze and Decide. Analyze can be further divided 
into various stages: 1) execution - whether the intended test 
case has been executed? 2) pass/fail assessment – monitoring 
the execution of the scenario and assessing the runtime output 
against a set of pre-defined pass/fail criteria/metrics, 3) 
scenario parameter space exploration – based on the current 
and past concrete parameters (e.g., speed, acceleration) and the 
pass/fail criteria, and a test case generator such as optimization 
algorithms that can be applied to introduce a new set of test 
case parameters with the aim of violating the scenario pass 
criteria. The output from the test case generator will result in 
the creation of new test cases and can then be fed back into 
execution module. This allows the increase of scenario 
coverage, the decrease of the ‘unknow unsafe’ region and the 
addition of new test cases into the database. The final stage is 
the Decide stage, based on whether the intended test cases have 
occurred, the assessment on the pass/fail criteria and the 
scenario coverage. were achieved. This stage will determine 
the output of the whole V&V process. 
III. VALIDATING TEST ENVIRONMENT AND TESTING ADS 
Although the main focus of this paper is to illustrate the 
testing workflow of the ADSs, the comparison of simulation 
against real world has also been explored. The purpose of the 
ADS testing is to test the ADS irrespective to its test 
environment. Given that simulation will play a key role in ADS 
testing, it is essential to also validate simulation as a test 
environment, in order to have confidence from the results of 
the ADS testing using simulation. The purpose of the 
simulation test against real world test comparison is to 
investigate the representativeness of the simulation 
environment. Therefore, the V&V process needs to consider 
both ADS testing and validation of the simulation (i.e. 
simulation and real-world comparison). Both these aspects can 
further be divided into activities based in physical environment 
and activities based in virtual environment.  
Figure 2 illustrates the high-level workflow for both ADS 
testing and validation of simulation (i.e. simulation against real 
world comparison). Within the ADS testing, several scenario 
generation methods may be used for generating test scenarios 
that can result in a large number of scenarios for the tests. To 
effectively carry out large scale testing, first the simulation-
based testing must be conducted, then a smaller set of selected 
scenarios for real world testing may be selected. One of the 
assumptions made within the ADS testing workflow is that 
‘simulation and real-world environments are comparable’, and 
hence simulation can be utilized to act as a filter and explorer 
for the scenario parameter space in order to provide the inputs 
to more economically expensive and risk-bearing real-world 
testing.  
In the OmniCAV project, for simulation against real world 
comparison, a number of scenarios are generated using CCTV 
footage and accident data analysis. These scenarios represent 
the most common hazardous situations a vehicle could 
Figure 2: ADS testing flow, and simulation against real world comparison 
workflow 
 
Figure 1: Elements of scenario-based workflow 
encounter. This set of scenarios are then concretized to 
generate test cases and executed in both simulation and real-
world environments. It should be noted that for ADS testing 
different execution environments are used in a sequential order, 
whereas for the validation of the simulation, they are executed 
in parallel. To replicate the real world environment, 
environmental data were collected within a combined 
rural/urban road loop in Oxfordshire in the UK [15], and a 
digital twin was created for simulation execution. During the 
execution, the same format of scenario data was received from 
both environments and were then compared. For rest of this 
paper, the simulation-based V&V workflow depicted in Figure 
2 will be illustrated in further detail. This functional block will 
be expanded into a complete workflow at both functional and 
implementation levels. 
IV. SIMULATION-BASED V&V WORKFLOW 
Figure 3 illustrates the logic flow of the simulation-based 
V&V process in terms of functionalities that have been 
developed in the OmniCAV project. Scenarios are generated 
and described using a human and machine-readable format at 
the logical scenario level. They are stored in the Safety PoolTM 
scenario database [16] and ready for query for testing via API. 
A scenario selector is implemented for performing such API 
calls. It iterates within a specific scenario library and retrieves 
individual logical scenarios. The test case generator is then 
used to generate test case parameters and optionally convert the 
test case into other desired executable formats. Upon 
execution, the test case data is processed and checked against 
three decision modules. The first one is whether the intended 
test case situation occurred. If yes, then the test case pass/fail 
criteria is checked. If no, then the test case run is checked 
against a pre-defined maximum iteration number of test cases. 
The test case pass/fail criteria module consists multiple types 
of criteria sources. If a test case fails the criteria then its 
parameters combination is recorded and the current logical 
scenario testing is terminated. If a test case passes, then it will 
be checked against the maximum iteration limit. In the last 
step, if the maximum iteration is not reached, the current test 
case parameters together with the pass criteria will be fed into 
test case generator where algorithms such as Bayesian 
optimization [9] (used in OmniCAV project) can be applied as 
“concretizer” to introduce new parameters with the goal of 
violating the pass criteria. The closed-loop formed by test case 
generator, the test execution and the three test case checks 
enable the exploration the parameter space set out within the 
logical scenarios, while increasing the test coverage and reduce 
the ‘unknown unsafe’ case.  
A. Scenario generation 
Currently, there are two different approaches for scenario 
generation: knowledge-driven and data-driven [5]. A 
knowledge-driven scenario generation approach utilizes 
domain specific knowledge to identify hazardous events 
systematically and create scenarios. A data driven approach 
utilizes the available data to identify and classify occurring 
scenarios. Eight different scenario generation approaches have 
additionally been investigated, as shown in Figure 4. Three of 
them are currently implemented in the OmniCAV project 
(options 1, 2, and 3 illustrated in Figure 3), and the other five 
methods have further been developed as part of a safety 
assurance framework for ADS. Since the focus of this paper is 
on the framework and its architectural implementation, all the 
individual elements such as scenario generation have been 
introduced at a high level, For further details can be found in 
the references provided.  
For option 1, the publicly available STAT19 [17] UK 
accident dataset was analyzed to identify accident hotspots and 
scenario parameters which contribute to causation of accidents 
with carrying high levels of severity [15].  For option 2, 
anonymized insurance claim records provided by one of the 
OmniCAV project partners (Admiral) were also analyzed to 
identify the trends in near-miss events that lead to insurance 
claims [18]. For option 3, an extension to the Systems 
Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) method was used to 
analyze the characteristics of the ADS architecture and identify 
system failures and hazardous situations [19]. The analysis was 
then converted into a set of logical scenarios together with their 
corresponding pass/fail criteria. 
In addition to the options 1, 2 and 3, options 4 to 8 were 
have been explored and included in the framework. Option 4 
uses the formal analysis approach with the highway code rules 
for scenario generation. Each of the highway code rules 
describes a hypothetical driving scenario with the 
corresponding behavior and ODD (Operational Design 
Domain) elements. The ODD is a specification set out by the 
manufacture of an ADS and it defines the operating conditions 
within which the ADS can operate safely [20]. Formal models 
are generated via a model template to create the mathematical 
representations of those scenarios, collecting the combinations 
of ODD and behavior parameters. The analysis reports the 
maneuver parameters that are near the boundary of violation, 
and produce scenarios that represent these set of violations. 
Option 5 uses similar formal representation as of option 4, but 
applied to the ODD of the ADS.  
To effectively test the system against its defined ODD, only 
the boundary cases will be selected as compared to the whole 
ODD. In order to achieve this, the ODD specification is 
  
Figure 3: Logical flow of the simulation-based V&V process 
parameterized and represented by a formal model. Then the 
parameter combinations that form the ODD boundary that 
trigger a Minimal Risk Manoeuvre (MRM) or a transition 
demand can be extracted and result in a set of scenarios.  
Inspired by the works in [4][5], option 6 uses an ontology-
based scenario generation approach. Within this paper, 
ontology-based approach is proposed to be used to generate 
multiple similar scenarios from one set of input. An ontology 
defines all the classes within the domain. It also includes all the 
relationships between classes and all the pre-defined rules. An 
example rule can be ‘if road A is connected to road B, then the 
width of road A must equal to the width of road B’, such rules 
will ensure the correct instantiation of a scenario. By using: 1) 
a well-developed ontology (with the associated rules and 
properties); and 2) highly abstract scenario description of 
interest at the function level or a set of conditions, the abstract 
information can be detailed and used to generate large number 
of logical scenarios that can satisfy the initial conditions. 
In addition to the above scenario generation methods, the 
existing scenarios already defined in the standards, regulations 
or guidelines (option 7) can also be utilized for the testing of 
ADSs, for example the scenarios set out in ISO22737 [21] and 
EuroNCAP [22]. ISO22737 has been developed for low-speed 
automated driving systems (LSAD) and the EuroNCAP 
provides a set of testing scenarios for the safety assurance of 
vehicles. An example of EuroNCAP scenario converted into 
logical scenario was previously illustrated in this paper section 
IV-B [6]. Option 8 includes the scenarios that occur during real 
world trials and deployments. Such scenarios might have not 
been considered pre-deployment, but are key learnings. 
B. Scenario description language and sceanrio database 
After generating the scenario content, an adequate scenario 
description language (SDL) is used to represent the content and 
enable its sharing and execution. A two-level abstraction 
approach of SDL, as depicted in Figure 5, has been previously 
developed and published as part of the OmniCAV project [6]. 
It was developed after analyzing the inputs received from 
various stakeholders such as AV developers, test engineers, 
regulators. SDL level 1 sits at the functional scenario level and 
is more abstract and its syntax resembles a structured natural 
language format. SDL level 2 sits at the logical and concrete 
scenario levels. It uses a formal machine-readable format, as 
shown in Figure 5. By additional detailing, one can convert 
SDL level 1 into level 2, and by abstracting the opposite can be 
achieved. In addition SDL level 2 can be converted to other 
ASAM OpenX formats for wider tool support. 
The basic content of the SDL covers the scenery aspect, the 
environmental conditions, and the behavior aspect of the non-
Ego agents; here the Ego refers to the vehicle under test. The 
concepts that cover the scenery and environmental conditions 
are referenced to the BSI PAS 1883 (Operational Design 
Domain (ODD) taxonomy) [20]. For the behavior aspect of the 
SDL, it is divided into maneuvers and agent type. Maneuvers 
include relative maneuvers and absolute maneuvers. Relative 
maneuvers indicate relations between multiple dynamic actors 
such as pedestrians, vehicles; such maneuvers include cutting 
in, moving towards which required two actors. Absolute 
maneuvers can be applied to a single actor, such as drive, turn 
right, etc. Agent type includes road users, pedestrians, and 
animals. For the scenery aspects, SDL considers any scenery 
settings as a roads-and-junctions network. Each road or 
junction is described individually using the types and the 
associated ODD attributes. In addition, for each junction, the 
connecting roads and lanes as well as connecting angles are 
also required, this can be referenced to the individual road 
description and allow the composition of the entire scenery. 
For the behavior description, the overall structure contains two 
parts: initialization phase and maneuvers phases. Initialization 
phase sets out the initial road and lane for each actor, the 
relative heading angles and relative positions between actors 
can also be defined. For the maneuver phases, a behavior tree 
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Figure 5: Two-level scenario description language mapped to the 
scenario abstraction levels 
style description format is utilized. Each actor contains 
multiple activity phases in a sequential relation; when two 
actors are performing activities at the same time the activity 
phases between the two actors are in a parallel relation. Each 
activity phase consists of the actual maneuver activity and a 
trigger condition. Figure 6 illustrates the logic of an SDL 
behavior description consists of three actors, the first two 
actors each has two activity phases and these two actors are 
performing actions at the same time. The third actor starts to 
perform activities after the first two actors have stopped for the 
remaining of the scenario. The environment part of the SDL is 
treated as global ambient conditions that apply throughout the 
scenario. The list of all the values for the environment related 
ODD attributes within the SDL are also defined.  
After creating the scenarios with SDL format, the next 
stage is to store them in a scenario database, which can be used 
by individuals and organizations to exchange, host, query and 
analyze them. In OmniCAV project, all the generated scenarios 
(~100,000) have been hosted in the Safety PoolTM Database.  
Scenario labels are used for query and analysis providing roles 
of tagging the real-world route with individual ODD labels and 
API connection and scenario visualization. 
C. Test case generator and execution 
Once the scenarios have been populated into the database, a 
scenario selector retrieves the relevant scenarios iteratively via 
API calls from the database, each individual logical scenario is 
then passed into the test case generator and starts the testing 
cycle. The test case generator can be divided into two different 
settings: the initial iteration, and subsequent iterations. During 
the initial iteration, the concrete test case parameters are 
instantiated using the average values of each value range 
defined in the OmniCAV project case. For the subsequent 
iterations, optimization algorithms can be implemented to 
intelligently select the parameter combinations for the next test 
case based on the test case assessment. A Bayesian 
optimization algorithm is implemented in the OmniCAV 
project, it is developed further based on the study given in [9], 
in which it investigated using Bayesian optimization and STPA 
scenarios to explore the unknown unknowns. From the test 
case analysis, both the scenario variables and the pass/fail 
assessment are provided to the test case generator where the 
optimization algorithm is embedded. The newly identified 
values create the next test case with the optimization goal of 
driving the system to violate its safe boundaries. It should be 
noted that the Bayesian optimization is only one example of 
the test case generator, one could fit other algorithms to 
generate new test cases, such as constraint randomization. 
Upon generating the test case, the next step is to run it in the 
simulation environment. In the OmniCAV project, Unity-based 
simulator developed by Thales UK-XPI is used for the 
environment simulation. The real-world generated map 
containing parts of Oxfordshire was developed for the XPI 
simulator. The simulator was then integrated with the ADS, the 
traffic simulator, and the test case analysis engine. 
D. Test case analysis 
1) Is the intended test case occurred? 
The first step of the test case analysis is assessing whether 
the intended test case has taken place. The SDL behavior 
element is constructed and implemented using a behavior tree 
style. This provides the means for monitoring and assessment 
of the test case progress. Figure 7 illustrates an example 
behavior tree that consists of both parallel and sequential 
activities. 
On the main branch, it has Initialization, Manoeuvre1 and 
Maneuver_set in a sequence. Within Manoeuvre1, it has 
action1 and exit_cond1 in parallel relation with a success on 
one criteria. This means whichever node within the parallel 
relation finishes this tree branch, will succeed. Within 
Maneuver_set branch, it contains the maneuvers for both actor 
1 and actor 2, along with their exit conditions. By using such 
behavior tree implementation, it provides the ability to assess 
which node has been completed, terminated, failed or in-
progress. In the example, Initialization is completed and 
Maneuver1 is completed as well by the exit_cond1 being 
satisfied. However, within Maneuver_set the 
actor2_manoeuvre is failed due to its exit condition failed. 
Such information generated by the behavior tree 
implementation is used to assess whether the intended scenario 
has occurred. 
2) Is test case passed/failed? 
If the previous assessment result is yes, the test case data 
will then be passed to the “pass/fail assessment function”. 
However, if the assessment result is no, the test case will be 
checked against a pre-defined iteration limit. For the pass/fail 
assessment, several different types of criteria can be used 
including: STPA related, Highway Code derived, ODD related 
Figure 6: Example logics of an SDL behavior description 
 
 
Figure 7: Example behavior tree status of a test case 
 
or a set of generic criteria. Each of the STPA scenarios has its 
own specifically tailored pass criteria, however such criteria 
need to be converted into a machine-readable format and made 
accessible to the ADS. In [19], authors illustrate detailed 
insight into STPA-based scenario generation and evaluation. 
The ODD based evaluation method uses the ODD 
specification of the ADS to form a safe operating boundary and 
evaluates the simulation ground truth data against the boundary 
during runtime. At any given point, the ADS could be inside or 
outside of its ODD, this can then be used to assess its ability to 
maintain within its ODD. In order to represent such boundary, 
a human readable and machine readable language was 
developed [23], the domain attributes used within the language 
were referenced to the BSI PAS 1883 ODD taxonomy [20]. 
The ground truth data is retrieved from the simulator during 
runtime, such ground truth is then filtered to only contain the 
attributes listed in the ODD taxonomy, and subsequently 
converted into a common intermediate format. On the other 
hand, the ODD specification is parsed and converted into the 
same intermediate format. An ODD assessment module is then 
implemented to compare the two intermediate formats derived 
from the ground truth data and ODD specification. In the 
OmniCAV project, an ontology-based assessment method is 
implemented, it utilizes open-source ontology reasoner to infer 
inside/outside of ODD. The UK highway code converted 
Digital Highway Code (DHC) is developed to serve as an 
oracle and evaluate the ADS’ ability to obey the regulations. 
The DHC model contains ODD elements as well as the 
behavior elements, with each individual Highway Code rule 
being analyzed and converted into a quantifiable format. 
Ontology framework is used to represent the domain model 
and the rules, and ontology reasoner is used to perform runtime 
assessment of the ADS. In addition to the STPA-based, ODD-
based and DHC-based test case pass/fail assessment, a set of 
generic assessment criteria are also used in the OminCAV 
project. For example, a fixed timeout is used to terminate test 
cases if needed. Collision criteria are also implemented to fail 
test cases whenever a collision of the vehicle is detected. Other 
criteria such as lane keeping, average speed limit, and 
maximum speed limit are also included. 
3) Is maximum iteration of the test case reached? 
Based on the pass/fail assessment, if the result is yes, the 
workflow is then sent to check whether the maximum iteration 
for the test case has reached. If the result is no, then the current 
test case parameter combination will be logged and the testing 
of the current scenario will be terminated. The maximum 
iteration is set to stop large number of loops for the test case 
generation within the same logical scenario. In our case,  a hard 
limit is implemented across all the logical scenarios. 
V. IMPLEMENTATION ARCHITECTURE OF THE V&V 
WORKFLOW 
So far the functionality of the V&V workflow has been 
introduced. This section illustrates the implementation of the 
workflow. As shown in Figure 8, the necessary functions are 
modularized into four parts: Test manager, Simulation, Test 
Case Generator, and Test Case Analyzer. The Test Manager is 
in charge of orchestrating the whole workflow, all the 
communications are established between other modules and 
Test Manager. Simulation contains the environment simulator, 
the traffic simulator and the ADS under test. The Test Case 
Generator is for generating concrete test case parameters and 
optionally converts into other scenario format prior to 
execution. The Test Case Analyzer contains test case indexing 
– in order to obtain the scenario parameter variables and test 
case evaluation – for checking 1) whether intended test case 
occurred, 2) pass/fail assessment, and 3) whether maximum 
test case iteration is reached. The whole workflow is initiated 
by the Test Manager which is integrated with the scenario 
database for selecting the logical scenario and pass the scenario 
information to the Test case generator via scripts. Concrete test 
case is then generated by using the average values of the 
parameter value ranges, and optionally converted into other 
desired scenario formats before being sent back to the Test 
Manager. Meanwhile Test Manager also sends the scenario 
information to the Test Case Analyzer for indexing via 
protobuf (Protocol Buffers as a method of serializing structured 
data). Upon receiving the generated test case, Test manager 
sends the converted test case to Simulation using protobuf, it 
then sends a run signal to start the simulation. During runtime, 
live data is communicated between the Simulation and Test 
case evaluation module via protobuf. The Test case evaluation 
will then produce the evaluation results and send back to Test 
Manager. Test Manager then stops the simulation run, and 
checks the evaluation results against the three decision boxes. 
Based on the outcome, the Test Manager: 1) select a new 
logical scenario to test, 2) command to generate new test cases 
under the same logical scenario. Finally, Figure 9 shows a tool 
 
Figure 8: Implementation architecture of the workflow 
 
chain developed executing scenarios and test cases in the 
OmniCAV project. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a number of challenges are presented for 
V&V of Autonomous Systems. To address some of the main 
challenges, we introduced a scalable and domain agnostic 
V&V framework, demonstrated in an ADS context. This 
framework covered a number of key elements for conducting 
V&V tests in both simulation and physical environments. The 
paper mainly illustrated the details of the simulation-based 
V&V process and covered scenario generation, scenario 
description format, test case generation, test case evaluation 
methods and parameter space exploration methods, all with the 
aim of gathering evidence for both functional and behavioral 
verification. Using the framework, we developed and 
implemented the framework into a toolchain for practically 
conducting the V&V tests. 
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